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Introduction

The value of accuracy in trials seems self-evident: a more accurate trial better
distinguishes between the guilty and the innocent. And the greater is the wedge
between the penalty for guilt and innocence, the better is the incentive to comply
with the law. This, of course, does not mean that society should have perfectly
accurate courts. Greater accuracy comes with greater administrative costs. For
the most part, the literature says that the appropriate welfare calculation trades oﬀ
the deterrence benefit of accuracy against the cost of investing in truth-enhancing
procedures (See Kaplow (1994); Kaplow and Shavell (1994); Kaplow and Shavell
(1996); Posner (2007)). The Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge 1 endorsed a
similar calculation. In evaluating a due process claim, the Court held that courts
should weigh the value of the property, the probability of errorneous deprivation,
and the cost of additional safeguards.
In this paper, we question the value of court accuracy even if there is no
cost to making courts more accurate. The context is products liability, but the
analysis generalizes to other types of cases.2 The focus is on information trials
provide to consumers who do not participate in the litigation. This is a large
fraction of consumers, as few ever sue producers.3 In this setup, non-litigating
consumers learn something from trial outcomes about the underlying product and
update their beliefs accordingly. Consumers use this information to decide whether
to take precautions. While costly, these precautions provide protection. A key
assumption is that consumers have trouble distinguishing firms that have never
been sued and ones that have been sued and settled. This is in part because many
settlements have non-disclosure clauses and in part because settlements are less
1

424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Our analysis applies to any legal cases where outsiders rely on trial outcomes to make inferences: licensors of patented technology, employers of convicted felons, etc. Moreover, the
model may be extended to any situation where individuals learn from voluntary audits of third
parties, e.g., consumers learning the quality of drugs voluntarily submitted for FDA review or
new consumer products voluntarily provided to product testers for review.
3
Our model only requires that most consumers not sue producers, not that most injured
consumers not sue. This is obviously true. Indeed, there is evidence that in some markets,
most injured consumers do not even sue. For example in the medical malpractice context, it
has been reported that only 2% of patients injured during treatment sue their doctor (Localio
et al. 1991).
2
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newsworthy than guilty verdicts. This allows producers to use settlement to hide
information about the quality of their products. Under these conditions, we show
that inaccurate courts elicit more information about producers and thus improve
welfare over perfectly accurate courts.4
The logic behind our result is fairly straighforward. Consider the case where
some producers make safe products ("good types") and others make dangerous
products ("bad types"). Consumers are uncertain whether specific products are
safe or not. Assuming some good type and some bad type producers are sued,5 improving accuracy has two eﬀects. The first eﬀect is that, conditional on a producer
opting to go to trial, a more accurate court produces more information about the
product. On this dimension, accuracy benefits consumers and enhances welfare.
There is, however, an oﬀsetting selection eﬀect. The more accurate a trial is, the
more reluctant bad type producers will be to go to trial. Instead the bad type will
settle to mask their product quality. On this "selection" dimension, increasing
accuracy reduces information to consumers and lowers welfare.
When courts are perfectly accurate, no bad type goes to trial and, as a consequence, the legal process can’t identify them. In contrast, if courts are flawed,
bad types will occasionally risk litigation in the hope of a mistaken exoneration
that will certified their product as safer than average. But the bad types won’t
always be so fortunate. Even with inaccurate courts, sometimes the bad types will
be found out. And so long as the bad type is more likely than the good type to
be found liable, that finding will provide useful information to consumers about
the appropriate precautions to take. The lesson is that, to get any information
whatsoever about the bad types, courts must be willing to exonerate some of them
4

This paper relates to Malani and Laxminarayan (2011), which demonstrates that more accurate tests for detecting disease outbreaks may discourage the voluntary reporting of disease
outbreaks. This paper extends that analysis by endogenizing both victim precaution and injurer
investment in safety.
5
In this paper we equate good firms with non-liable firms; firms that have met the relevant
legal standard. e.g., firms that did not, say, develop a product with design defect. Continuing
this example, we assume that products without a design defect can cause injury. As a result
injury does not, by itself, demonstrate liability. Even under the strict liability standard for, say,
a product defect injury itself does not necessarily lead to liability; the consumer still must prove
causation. Given that a consumer, to start, may only know that she has suﬀered injury, there is
likely to be suits against both good and bad type firms. We take up the issue that bad firms
may be sued more often than good firms in Section 3.
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— to tolerate mistakes.
The main result doesn’t change if bad firms are sued more often than good
firms. Because bad firms face a higher rate of suit, exoneration will not overcome
the negative inference consumer associate with a firm that has been sued. Increasing accuracy — unless perfection can be achieved — is pointless because consumers
suspect that every sued firm is bad. Anticipating this inference, both good and
bad firms settle on the same terms and receive the same payoﬀ. In this pooling
equilibrium, additional court accuracy fails to generate gaps in the payoﬀs between
the two types.
We next consider the case where producers of dangerous products can invest
in product safety, i.e., bad types can transform themselves into good types. In
this scenario, accuracy has a third eﬀect — the production of safer products. The
law and economics literature endorses accuracy primarily based on this deterrent
eﬀect. We weigh all three eﬀects and show that, under some conditions, inaccurate courts still generate higher welfare. The conditions depend on two factors:
(1) the eﬃciency of consumer precautions vis-a-vis producer precautions and (2)
the proportion of firms that remain bad types even with perfect courts. Such a
proportion is positive because for some firms the cost of complying with the legal
standard is too high.
From these results we draw normative conclusions about legal procedure and
find interesting connections between accuracy and other topics in law and economics. First, the more important is victim precaution relative to injurer precaution for preventing injuries, the more courts should tolerate mistaken exonerations.
This suggests an analogy between the eﬀects of accurate courts (versus inaccurate
courts) and of strict liability (versus no liability), given that strict liability is beneficial when activity level shifts by injurers are relatively more eﬃcient than activity
level shifts by consumers (Posner 2007).
Second, we show that a rule that banned settlement or mandated the disclosure of settlement terms would be preferred by producers before they learned
their type. Such a rule also improves social welfare. This result resembles an
important finding from Shavell (1994) on the consequences of mandatory disclosure by sellers of verifiable information. Shavell shows that, before learning their
type, firms would prefer mandatory disclosure over voluntary disclosure. The main
3

distinction between the two results is that Shavell is concerned that voluntary disclosure encourages excessive acquisition of information about product quality by
producers because it provides an option to hide bad information. In contrast, we
are concerned that voluntary settlement discourages the dissemination of useful
information through litigation.
Third, whereas mistaken exonerations (false negatives) encourage bad types to
go to trial, mistaken convictions (false positives) discourage them from doing so.
Criminal law demonstrates a greater tolerance for mistaken exonerations than for
mistaken convictions, resting this bias on the value judgment that it is better to
free ten guilty people than convict one innocent person (Blackstone 1769). We
show that the same bias should be applied whenever there are informational gains
to third parties from knowing which parties are bad actors.
The paper unfolds in five sections. Section 2 considers the case where producers
cannot invest to improve the quality of their product. It focuses on equilibria in
which bad types mix between trial and settlement and good types go to trial.
Section 3 examines equilibrium when good firms are sued less often than bad
firms. Section 4 expands the model to include investment. Section 5 concludes.
The appendix contains proofs for each proposition in the main text.

2

The Model

Good and bad firms populate the market. The proportion of good firms is   ; the
proportion of bad firms is   . Products from bad firms cause harm at a higher rate
than products from good firms. After accounting for the relatively low chance of
injury, consumers attach a value of  to products from a good firm. They attach a
value  − to consuming from a bad firm, where  is the expected cost of additional
injuries caused by the bad product. Without loss of generality, we set  =  so
the net value of consuming a product from a bad type is zero. Basically, good
and bad types are diﬀerentiated only with respect to the probability of causing
consumer injury. The value of buying the more dangerous product is zero; the
value of buying the safer product is  .
The plaintiﬀ faces a non-trivial signal extraction problem when she suﬀers a
harm. The plaintiﬀ does not know whether the harm was caused by the good
4

product, the bad product, or some other source, including her own conduct. She
files a lawsuit, hoping to catch the responsible party. If the firm is found not liable,
the plaintiﬀ recovers nothing. If the firm is found liable, the plaintiﬀ recovers
damages, .
To start, suppose that bad firms and good firms are sued with the same probability . This assumption is important. If only bad firms are sued, consumers will
make a negative inference from any trial outcome, including exoneration. Trial
accuracy becomes irrelevant, as will show in section 3 below.
At a cost of , consumers can take a precaution that eliminates the possibility of
additional harm from the bad product, raising the net surplus from a bad product
to  − . Suppose that   , so that precautions are eﬃcient when the product
comes from a bad firm.
We depart from the literature and assume settlement decisions are made in
anticipation of both the expected damage award and the consequences of a verdict
for future sales. Intuition suggests that bad firms might settle to avoid the negative
publicity of a verdict finding liability, a verdict more likely against a bad firm.
At the same time, a good firm might benefit from going to trial because the
finding of no-liability certifies that the firm is better than the average firm in the
market (a market that, remember, is populated by both good and bad firms). The
equilibrium described below confirms that this is indeed true.
The court makes errors, which come in two flavors. The court might mistakenly
exonerate a bad firm or the court might mistakenly convict a good firm. Formally,
let these errors be represented as
1 − 1 = Pr{bad type found not liable}
1 − 2 = Pr{good type found liable}
The type I error (the false positive or mistaken exoneration) is 1 − 1 ; the type II
error (the false negative or mistaken conviction) is 1 − 2 . As 1 or 2 increase,
the court becomes more accurate. We assume trials are minimally informative, so
1  12 and 2  12 .
We assume consumers know not only  ,  and , but also the rate of suit  and
the level of court accuracy, 1 and 2 . To focus on the information value of trials,
5

suppose that firms cannot signal their type in the absence of suit. This means we
ignore warranties and the use of other third party monitors. The restriction on
third party monitors is not a severe one since our analysis of the value of accuracy
in trials can be extended to the value of accuracy of any third party monitors. We
also assume that firms cannot "volunteer" for suit and increase .
Finally, trials are costless for firms and can be made more accurate at zero cost.
The deck is thus stacked in favor of a system of perfectly accurate courts because
we assume away the the usual reasons given for tolerating judicial mistakes.
A.
Consumer Purchases
Consumers make purchasing decisions based on the results of the trial process
and the equilibrium strategies of the firms. Consumers receive one of three signals: a court finding of "no liability", a court finding of "liability", or no finding
whatsoever. Let  be the consumer’s belief the firm is bad if he observes a court
finding of "not liable"; let  be the consumer’s belief the firm is bad if he observes
a court finding of "liable"; and let  be the consumer’s belief that a firm is a bad
type if he observes no trial finding at all.
Consumer beliefs determine what price they are willing to pay for the product
and whether they take precautions. If consumers do not take precautions, they
obtain the expected value of the good, given their beliefs about firm type. This
value is just the consumer’s belief that the firm is a good type times  . If consumers take precautions, they get  −   0 whether the firm turns out to be good
or bad. Precautions are well spent if the firm is a bad type, but wasted if the firm
is a good type.6 Consumers will take precautions if
 −   (1 − )  or  ≤ 
where  ∈ {   } is the consumer’s posterior belief that the firm is a bad type.
6

In the precaution case, the price following a unfavorable verdict is constant at  − . This
simplification eases the notation. If consumer precautions resulted in say  −  instead of 
after a negative verdict, price would fall as the consumer’s beliefs become more pessimistic. However, our results would not change. Although there is a constant price following an unfavorable
verdict, the welfare eﬀects of consumer precautions depend on the precision of the beliefs. More
specifically, as the precision of the beliefs following an unfavorable verdict increase, the chance
of consumers misfiring — spending resources on precautions when the firm is, in fact, a good type
— goes down.

6

Firms make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers that extract all the consumer surplus. The
price firms charge anticipates the precaution taken by the consumer. If it is in the
consumer’s interest to take a precaution in a particular state of the world, the firm
charges  −. If it is not in the consumer’s interest to take a precaution in a specific
state of the world, the firm charges (1 − )  , where again  ∈ {   }. Combining the firm’s take it or leave it oﬀer with the consumer’s rational deployment of
precautions, prices for future sales can be written as:
  = max { −  (1 −  )  } =  − min{   }

  = max { −  (1 − )  } =  − min{  }
  = max { −  (1 − )  } =  − min{  }

  is the price following a court finding of "no liability";   is the price following
a court finding of "liability"; and   is the price following no court finding, what
we term the market price.
B.
Settlement
The defendant makes a take it or leave it settlement oﬀer to the plaintiﬀ.7
The settlement oﬀer will be lowest one that the plaintiﬀ will accept. As will be
demonstrated below, only bad firms settle in equilibrium. Since the simple act of
engaging in settlement talks perfectly reveals that a firm is bad, the lowest oﬀer
the plaintiﬀ will accept is 1  — the plaintiﬀ’s expected value from taking the bad
type to trial.
A central assumption we make is that, while consumers know the rate of suit ,
consumers cannot observe whether a specific firm was sued. Thus the consumer
cannot distinguish between a firm that was not sued and one that was sued and
settled. To make this assumption robust, we also assume that consumers cannot
observe whether firms engage in settlement talks.
Finally, we assume that litigation is costless so that settlement is driven by its
eﬀect on consumer beliefs about type, and thus prices, rather than by litigation
costs. This assumption will also allow us to ignore the cost savings from litigation
7

The results carry over if the plaintiﬀ rather than the defendant makes the settlement oﬀer.
The diﬀerence is that the gains to the bad type from hiding its type via settlement flow to the
plaintiﬀ rather than the defendant.
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Figure 1: Settlement game without investment
in welfare calculations. We do not deny there are in fact savings from settlement
in the real world. However, those savings are unrelated to our inquiry into the
information value of court accuracy.
C.
Timing and Equilibrium Definition
Putting all this together, the timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature selects the initial distribution of types.
2. Firms are sued with probability, 
3. Firms decide whether to settle and, if so, make the plaintiﬀ an oﬀer.
4. Firms make consumers a take it or leave it oﬀer depending on the signal
received from trial or no signal at all.
5. Consumer decide how much to pay for the product and whether to take
precautions.
Figure 1 illustrates the extensive form game.
Let   and   be the probabilities that good and bad firms, respectively, go
to trial rather than settle. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium consists of a set of
ª
©
consumer beliefs  and a strategy profile,      such that:
8

(a) no firm type can deviate given the consistent consumer beliefs and the equilibrium strategy of the other firm type and
(b) where possible, beliefs are derived using Bayes rule from the equilibrium
strategies and the error rate in the courts.
Before analyzing the equilibria and doing the comparative statics, we make the
following assumption about the cost of precautions.
(A1)   (2  −  2 ) 
This assumption has two implications. First, it ensures that consumers take precautions, if at all, only after observing a finding of liability. That is, there exist a
suﬃciently large number of good types in the initial pool that consumer precautions are not cost-justified absent some additional evidence about the dangerousness of the product.8 Second, the assumption ensures that a higher probability of
finding the bad type liable does not increases the bad type’s return from going to
trial.
It should be acknowledged that assumption (A1) is actually stricter than what
is required to obtain the above two implications. It has the virtue, however, of
generating both implications at once and being couched in primitives of the model.
Assumptions that separately and more directly capture the two implications would
have to be written as conditions on consumer beliefs, which in turn would depend
on which specific equilibrium holds.

2.1

Equilibria and Comparative Statics

In comparing perfect and imperfect courts, the first task is to identify the equilibria
in each situation. The next proposition presents the equilibrium with perfect
courts. Following that, attention turns to courts that make errors.
8

If consumers took precautions even without a signal from the courts, bad types would prefer
trial to settlement. At trial, the bad firm might be mistakenly exonerated, obtaining the higher
payoﬀ associated with the no liability finding. At the same time, the bad firm receives  − 
whether it settles the case and cloak itself with the market or goes to court and is found liable.
These two eﬀects combine to make trial the best course of action for the bad type. While they
exist, equilibria where the bad type goes to trial for sure are not that interesting.

9

Proposition 1 With perfect courts, there always exists a separating equilibrium
where good firms go to trial and bad firms do not. Formally, we have (  = 1   =
0) and ( = 0  = 1  =    [ + (1 −   ) (1 − )]).
Proposition (1) provides a benchmark. When courts are perfect, good types
always go to trial because they are guaranteed to be found not liable and can
therefore charge a price  . On the other hand, bad types don’t go to trial because
trial guarantees a liability finding, meaning they can charge a price  − . By
settling, the bad type instead cloaks itself among the good firms that have not
been sued, meaning they can charge the market price of ( −  ), where A1
guarantees that    .
The fact that not every good type is sued plays a critical role. To see why,
suppose not. Every good firm would get sued; all would go to trial and be found
not liable. The consumers would then infer from the absence of a trial outcome
that the firm must be bad. In short, without this constraint, the market unravels
and all the private information is revealed.
Turning now to inaccurate courts, a semi-separating equilibrium exists in which
the good type goes to trial and the bad type randomizes between settling and going
to trial.9 For bad types to mix, they must be indiﬀerent between going to trial and
settlment. Given the error rates in the courts, expected prices, and the settlement
oﬀer, this indiﬀerence condition can be written as
(1 − 1 )  + 1 [  − ] =   − 1 

(1)

The LHS of equation (1) is the bad firm’s payoﬀ to trial. The firm reaps a return
on future sales of   when found not liable and a return on future sales of  
when found liable. In addition, the liability finding triggers the damage payment
. The RHS is the bad type’s return from settling the case. Settlement leads to
future sales at the market price, but requires a settlement payment of 1 . The
next proposition characterizes the semi-separating equilibrium.
Proposition 2 If courts are imperfect and assumption (A1) is satisfied, there
9

For other models of litigation where bad types randomize and good types go to trial, see
Baker & Mezzetti (2001) and Wickelgren and Friedman (2010).
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exists a semi-separating equilibrium where good firms always goes to trial and bad
firms randomize between going to trial and settlement. Formally, for any (1  2 ) ∈
¢
¡
Θ = (12 1) × (12 1), we have   = 1   =  ∗ and
=

   ∗ (1 − 1 )
   ∗ (1 − 1 ) +   2
=

=

   ∗ 1
  ∗ 1 +  (1 − 2 )

  (1 −  ∗ )
  (1 −  ∗ ) +   (1 − )

where  ∗ is the solution to equation (1).

The upside to trial for the bad type is that they may incorrectly obtain a
verdict of no liability. This signal increases the firm’s revenue because consumers
incorrectly infer the firm is a good type when it is, in fact, bad. The downside
to trial is that the bad type may receive a liability finding and revenues might
decline. Bad types randomize for a chance at the upside. Bad types do not go to
trial for sure because the price bump from being found not liable decreases as more
bad types go to trial. As bad types comprise a higher fraction of the trial pool,
consumers have more pessimistic view of product quality after any verdict and
thus pay a lower price. Eventually the revenue boost from a "not liable" finding
fails to oﬀset the downside risk of a liability verdict.
Since there is a semi-separating equilibrium for each value of 1 and 2 , it is
possible to explore how improving accuracy aﬀects the probability bad types go to
trial. When doing so, there are two scenarios to consider. One is where consumers
take precautions following a liability finding and the other where consumers do
not take precautions following a liability finding. In equilibrium, consumers take
precautions when the beliefs that liability signals a bad type is so strong that
precautions become cost-justified (i.e.,   (1  2   ∗ ) ).
Proposition 3 (A) Suppose consumers take precautions after a liability finding.
In any semi-separating equilibrium of Proposition 2, the probability that bad firms
go to trial (i) increases as mistaken exonerations (1 − 1 ) rise and (ii) decreases
as mistaken convictions rise (1 − 2 ).
(B) Suppose consumers do not take precautions after a finding of liability. In
any semi-separating equilibrium of Proposition 2, the probability that bad firms go
11

to trial (i) increases as mistaken exonerations (1 − 1 ) rise and (ii) may increase
or decreases as mistaken convictions (1 − 2 ) rise.
The intuition for the case where consumers take precautions after a liability
finding follows: Raising 1 , the probability that court finds a bad type liable, has
two competing eﬀects. The first eﬀect is to reduce the fraction of bad types among
those who are found not liable, making consumers more confident that exoneration
means that the firm is good. The resulting increase in the price following a finding
of no liability induces bad types to go to trial. The second eﬀect is to reduce the
probability that bad types will accidentally receive the no-liability signal and thus
fetch the higher price associated with exoneration. This encourages bad types not
to go to trial. Assumption (A1) ensures the second eﬀect more oﬀsets the first.10
As a result, increasing 1 discourages bad types from going to trial.
In contrast, raising 2 , the probability that a good type receives a finding of
no liability, makes the consumer more confident that the no-liability finding tracks
good types and the liability finding tracks bad types. The resulting increase in
the price paid after a no-liability finding raises the payoﬀ to a bad type from an
mistaken exoneration. Because consumers take precautions following a liability
finding, the payoﬀ from conviction, however, remains constant at  − . Thus
reducing mistaken convictions of good types encourages bad types to go to court.
The intuition for the case where consumers do not take precautions after a
liability finding diﬀers only with respect to the eﬀect of mistaken convictions. In
this case, reducing mistaken convictions increases the price following a no-liability
finding and decreases the price following a liability finding. Whether a greater
number of bad types go to trial depends on which eﬀect is larger. Appropriately
discounted by the chance the bad type receives each price, if the bump up in the
no-liability price exceeds the bump down in the liability price, reducing mistaken
convictions draws bad firms into court. Otherwise, reducing mistaken convictions
drives bad firms away from court.
10

Indeed, it would be somewhat perverse if increasing the probability of conviction benefitted
bad types.

12

2.2

Welfare

As noted in the introduction, the existing literature suggests the optimal amount
of trial accuracy balances the benefit of more accurate adjudication against the
financial and administrative cost of procedures that improve the accuracy of trials.
Because of those costs, scholars suggest that perfectly accurate courts are suboptimal. In our model, the cost to improving procedure is zero. Nevertheless we
find that perfectly accurate courts are suboptimal.
Proposition 4 (A) If consumers take precautions after a liability finding, the
welfare associated with courts that mistakenly exonerate bad types is higher than
the welfare associated with courts that are perfect. Lowering mistaken convictions,
however, improves welfare from imperfect courts. (B) If consumers do not take
precautions after a liability finding, accuracy has no impact on welfare.
The reason for the new welfare result is the positive externality associated
with trials. Getting bad types to go to trial reveals their type to consumers,
albeit imperfectly. If consumers take precautions after a liability finding, even
imperfect revelation facilitates welfare-enhancing deployment of precautions. But
getting bad types into trial requires the prospect of mistaken exoneration.
Of course, with inaccurate courts, precautions misfire when good types are mistakenly found liable. Such misfires waste precautions. One might suspect that the
potential for wasted precautions could mean the inaccurate courts reduce welfare.
Not so. The reason is that consumers only take precautions when their expected
value is positive after accounting for this misfiring.
In contrast to mistaken exonerations, mistaken convictions reduce welfare. To
see this, note that expected welfare with inaccurate trials is
 =    +     1 [ − ] −  (1 − 2 )

(2)

The first term is the welfare from consuming good products, the second term is
the welfare from consuming products from bad firms that are found liable, and
third term is the welfare loss from misfiring precautions at good firms that are
mistakenly convicted. A reduction in mistaken convictions — an increase in 2
— reduces the last term. An increase in 2 also increases the second term in
13

the welfare equation because it increases the proportion of bad types going to
trial according to Proposition 3. Together, these two eﬀects imply that reducing
mistaken convictions always increases welfare. And so, the optimal amount of
mistaken convictions is zero.
Philosophers, politicians and legal scholars have long suggested that greater
eﬀort be devoted to preventing mistaken convictions than to preventing mistaken
exonerations in criminal trials. Proposition 4 demonstrates that this principle
applies not just to criminal law but to any area of law. The justification for
asymmetric treatment need not rely on arguments about the "wrongfulness" of
imposing an undeserved punishment. Instead, the justification can be that asymmetric treatment induces bad people to select trial. This self-selection in turn
provides more information to third parties.
The aforementioned welfare results only apply when consumers take precaution
after a liability. If consumers do not take precautions, then welfare is the same
for perfect and imperfect courts. There is no way to salvage the value of products
sold by bad types. Nor is any precaution wasted on good types. Thus, accuracy
has no value.
The welfare analysis thus far suggests that inaccurate courts are superior to
perfect courts. The next obvious question is whether inaccurate courts are the
best we can do. No. The best policy couples perfect courts with a prohibition
on settlement. When settlement is prohibited, both good and bad types go to
trial. With perfect courts, trials perfectly signal types and thereby perfectly allocate precautions. Because firms appropriate all the surplus in our model, we
can demonstrate the superiority of perfect courts with a settlement restriction by
showing that firms would prefer to ban settlement before learning their type. The
next proposition states that this is, in fact, the case.
Proposition 5 Before learning their type, firms prefer a rule that prohibits settlement.
If a ban on settlement improves firm welfare, why do some firms settle? The
problem is the firms cannot commit to forgo settlement after they learn their
type. The lack of commitment power is what creates the welfare loss from perfect
courts. Of course, settlement has advantages; it reduces risk and saves on litigation
14

costs. But this model suggests a reason for making settlement more diﬃcult by,
for example, requiring judicial approval of all settlement decisions, especially when
consumer precautions are relatively important.

3

What if Bad Firms are Sued More Often?

Suppose the plaintiﬀ can conduct an investigation about which firms are good and
which firms are bad prior to suit. All else equal, plaintiﬀs prefer to sue bad firms.
Such an investigation would thus lead to a higher rate of suits against bad types.
Let the probability of suit against a bad firm be  and the probability of suit
against a good firm be (1 − ) where  ∈ ( 12  1].
If courts are perfect, there continues to exist the separating equilibrium described in Proposition 1. Bad types always want to settle because they will
always be found liable at trial. If courts are imperfect and the fraction of bad
types sued is low enough, there exist a semiseparating equilibrium that is similar to
that described in Proposition 2. However, if the fraction of bad types being sued
get high enough, we find the surprising result that the quality inference conveyed
to consumers by a no liability finding is weak. In fact, a firm’s payoﬀ from a finding of no liability might be worse than the payoﬀ from no signal at all, whatever
the firm’s type. If that transpires, both types of firm will want to settle. To get
there, both types make the same "pooling" settlement oﬀer. Given the plaintiﬀ’s
consistent beliefs, this pooling oﬀer makes the plaintiﬀ just indiﬀerent between
accepting the oﬀer and not. This result is described in the next proposition.
Proposition 6 Define
=

  2 
  2  +  (1 − 1 )[ − ]

If courts are imperfect,   ̄, and damages are suﬃciently small, then there
exists a pooling equilibrium where both bad and good type settle. Formally, for any
¡
¢
(1  2 ) ∈ Θ = (12 1) × (12 1), we have   = 0   = 0 and
=

  (1 − 1 )
  (1 − 1 ) +  (1 − )2

=
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  1
 1 +   (1 − )(1 − 2 )

 = 
For the pooling equilibrium, we must set  so that, given the level of court
errors, the consumer is pessimistic enough to take precautions following a finding
of no liability. The more accurate the court is, the higher this threshold and
the greater  must be to induce precautions even after a positive trial outcome.
Furthermore, the good type will have to pay more to settle the case than what
they anticipate paying the plaintiﬀ at trial. The reason is that to get the plaintiﬀ
to accept the oﬀer, the good type must pool with the bad type, paying an amount
of money that reflects the average value of the case, not the value of a case against
the good type.11 The good type makes this sacrifice to preserve the large bump in
future sales from hiding that a lawsuit had ever been filed.
In this equilibrium, the payoﬀs to the good and bad type are the same after
being sued. That said, the chance of being sued diﬀers. And with suit comes
the required settlement payment to the plaintiﬀ. So the payoﬀs for good and bad
types do diverge, but not because they face diﬀerent payouts in litigation but
rather because the chance of having a suit filed diﬀers. The normal way scholars
think that accruacy benefits society is by changing the payoﬀs to good and bad
types in litigation. Assuming the threshold on  is met, Proposition (4) suggests
that additional expenditures on accuracy will not have this eﬀect.
One final interesting feature of the pooling equilibrium is that the incentive
for the plaintiﬀ to find a bad type is self-limiting. Since all firms settle when 
exceeds ̄, the plaintiﬀ receives the same benefit whether he sues a good firm or
a bad firm, meaning the returns on further investigation to raise  are low. That
said, if bad firms trigger more accidents than good firms, it might be plausibly
argued that a plaintiﬀ suing randomly will find more bad types than good types,
i.e., that  will exceed ̄ even without investigation.
11

Given that the defendant makes the oﬀer, there does not exist an equilibium where the bad
type pays a higher settlement amount than the good type. To see this, suppose not. If the
oﬀers separate by types, the bad type will always want to deviate, mimic the good type’s lower
settlement oﬀer and still settle the case.
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Figure 2: Settlement game with investment

4

Producer Investment

Until now we have assumed that firms are either good or bad and can do nothing to
change that fact. This section allows bad firms to invest in quality and transform
themselves into good types. To simplify matters, we revive the assumption that
bad firms and good firms are sued with the same probability. Because accuracy
aﬀects welfare only if consumers take precautions, we focus on this in what follows.
Formally, suppose there still are  good types and   bad types. However,
bad types can now invest  and become a good type. The cost of investment varies
across bad firms, ranging from 0 to ∞. This cost is distributed according to  ().
Intuitively,  () is the fraction of bad firms that invest in a safer, higher quality
product. Figure 2 illustrates the timing of the game with investment.
Our benchmark remains a perfect court. Proposition 10 in the appendix shows
that there still exists a separating equilibrium in which only good types go to trial
and the bad types settle. The payoﬀ to a bad type that invests in quality and
becomes a good type is
 + (1 − )(1 − ) − 
(3)
where  is the probability of being sued and  is the posterior following no signal.
If the bad firm that transforms into a good firm is sued in a perfect court, it will
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be found not liable and obtain price  . If the transformed firm is not sued, they
get the market price of (1 − )  . The third term is the cost of investment. The
payoﬀ to remaining a bad type is
[(1 − ) − ] + (1 − )(1 − )

(4)

Following suit in a perfect court, the bad type immediately settles for − and gets
the market price for future sales. If the bad type is not sued, they also get the
market price. The level of investment at which the bad firm is indiﬀerent between
investing and not is obtained by setting (3) equal to (4) and solving for :
[ + ] = 

(5)

The left hand side of (5) is the benefit to a bad type of investing in quality with
perfect courts; the right hand side is the cost. The benefit has two components:
(1) if sued in a perfect court, the bad firm makes more money oﬀ future sales (
instead of (1 − ) ); (2) if sued, the bad firm no longer pays damages, .
Define  ∗Perfect as this solution to equation (5). If  ( ∗Perfect ) = 1, all bad firms
invest and there are no bad firms left in the market. If  ( ∗Perfect ) = 0, none
of the bad firms invest and we have the situation from before, with   bad firms
and  good firms. Given this, define the fraction of good firms in the market
as   =  +  ( ∗Perfect )  . Note that, because a bad firm might draw a high
investment cost, perfect courts do not induce every bad firm to invest in higher
quality. The next lemma is a formal statement of this argument.
Lemma 7 With perfect courts, not all bad firms invest to become good types. That
is, 0   ∗Perfect  ∞.
Now consider imperfect courts. Proposition 20 in the appendix demonstrates
that, under assumption (A1), there continues to be a semi-separating equilibrium
in which the good type always goes to trial and the bad type mixes. In this
equilibrium, the bad type’s payoﬀ to becoming a good type is
¡
¢
[2   + (1 − 2 )   −  ] + (1 − )  − 
18

(6)

As before, the first term is the payoﬀ when a bad firm invests in quality faces suit
and goes to trial. The second term is the payoﬀ from not being sued. The third
term is the cost. The bad type’s payoﬀ from remaining a bad type is
[1 (  − ) + (1 − 1 )  ] + (1 − ) 

(7)

The term in the square bracket is the payoﬀ to the bad type from going to trial. The
second term is the bad firm’s payoﬀ from not being sued. The level of investment
at which the bad firm is indiﬀerent between investing and not is obtained by setting
(6) equal to (7)
(8)
(1 + 2 − 1)[   −   + ] = 
The left hand side is the price premium associated with being a good type. The
right hand side is the cost. Let  ∗ be the investment level for the indiﬀerent firm.
The fraction of good firms is  =  +  ( ∗ )  , where  ( ∗ ) is the cumulative
probability that investment cost is less than  ∗ .
Two equations jointly determine investment and the remaining bad types mixing probability in the semi-separating equilibrium. First, there is equation (8),
which pins down the realization of investment cost that makes the bad firm indiﬀerent between investing and not. Second, there is equation (1) which ensures
that, given the prices associated with Bayes consistent updating by the consumers,
the bad type is indiﬀerent between trial and settlement. In equilibrium, both the
indiﬀerence conditions for investment and bad type mixing must hold.
As noted, the main result from the law and economics literature is that, because accuracy increases the gap between the payoﬀ to good and bad behavior, it
deters undesirable actions (Kaplow 1994; Kaplow and Shavell 1994). Under certain
stability conditions, our model yields the same result with respect to reductions in
mistaken exonerations (1 − 1 ). The deterrence implications of reducing mistaken
convictions (1 − 2 ), however, are uncertain.
Before formally stating these results, we present the two stability conditions:
(A2) [1 + 2 − 1]

¡  ¢


 1

|  | 
|
(A3) |(1 − 1 ) 
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The first condition requires that an increase in investment not increase the net
benefit to investment (that is, equation 6 is decreasing in ). The second condition
requires that additional investment increases the net benefit to going to trial to
bad firms. Together they ensure that imperfect courts yield less investment than
perfect courts ( ∗   ∗Perfect ) and that the bad type mixes.
Proposition 8 If consumers take precautions after a liability finding and assumptions (A1)-(A3) hold, then (i) an increase in 1 increases deterrence (that is,
 ∗
 0) and (ii) an increase in 2 has an ambiguous eﬀect on deterrence (that is,
1
∗
 ∗
 0 or 
 0).
1
2
If one reduces mistaken exonerations, fewer bad types submit to trial because
they are less likely to receive a favorable verdict. This causes a decrease in the
price when consumers observe no signal. After all, this price is based on the pool
of firms who do not receive a trial outcome, whether they were not sued or settled.
To maintain the bad type’s indiﬀerence between the settling and going to trial
when the payoﬀ to settling falls, the expected payoﬀ from going to trial must also
fall. Thus, reducing mistaken exonerations reduces the payoﬀ to being a bad type
whether they settle or go to trial. As a result, the gap between the payoﬀ to the
good and bad types increases. Since this gap determines the return on investing
in quality, investment rises.
Eliminating mistaken convictions does not necessarily have a similar, salutary
eﬀect. Under the same logic as Proposition 3, reducing mistaken convictions increases the proportion of bad types going to trial. As there are fewer bad types in
the pool of firms who do not obtain a trial verdict, the market price increases. As
a result, the payoﬀ to being a bad type increases. At the same time, the payoﬀ
to being a good type also increases because — by reducing mistaken convictions —
good types are more likely to receive a positive verdict. Since the payoﬀs to both
types increase, the impact of a change in mistaken convictions on the gap between
the two is uncertain.
With these comparative statics in hand, our attention turns to welfare. Welfare now depends on (1) whether consumers invest in precautions when purchasing
from a bad type and (2) how many firms invest in quality. Perfect courts yield
a higher amount of investment by firms but no precautions by consumers. Some
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Figure 3: Distribution of Investment Costs Among Firms
degree of inaccuracy diminishes the amount of investment by firms but facilitates
greater consumer precaution. Which is better? It turns out that whether court
inaccuracy improves welfare depends on two factors: (1) the eﬀectiveness of consumer precautions compared to producer investment and (2) the fraction of firms
that fail to invest in quality with perfect courts. The next proposition lays out the
formal statement of this result.
Proposition 9 Consider a court with errors 1  1 2 = 1, and a semi-separating
equilibrium where bad types invest if    ∗ and non-investing bad types mix with
probability  ∗ . When consumers take precautions, the welfare associated with this
equilibrium exceeds the welfare associated with perfect courts whenever

Z

∗

∗

 erf 

£¡
¡ ¢¢ ¤
1 −   0    ∗ 1 ( − ) 

¡
(   − )  ()  − [  ∗

 erf 

¢

−  ( ∗ )] ∗ 1   ( − )

To understand the condition under which imperfect courts improve welfare,
look at Figure 3, which plots the distribution of investment costs . We split the
possible values of  into three regions. The first region is investment costs less
than  ∗ , which is the investment level associated with the imperfect court . If the
firm draws a cost in this region, it invests in quality whether the court is perfect
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or not. The welfare implications of perfect and imperfect courts are the same over
this region.
The second region is between  ∗ and  ∗Perfect , which is the investment level
associated with perfect courts. Here accuracy matters. With perfectly accurate
courts, the firm makes the investment. The expected value of this investment
R  ∗Pe rfec t
(  − )  () . With imperfect courts, the firm does not make the
is  ∗
investment, and remains a bad type. Yet all is not lost. Given imperfect courts,
some fraction of these bad types are sued and go to trial, which facilitates the
deployment of consumer precautions. The expected value of consumer precautions
over this range is [ ( ∗Perfect )− ( ∗ )] ∗ 1   ( − ). The "net" benefit of perfect
courts over this range is the diﬀerence between the expected value of producer
investment and the expected value of consumer precautions, discounting this latter
value by the probability they are deployed.
Finally, there is the range of investments above  ∗Perfect . If a firm draws an
investment cost in this region, it never makes the investment. Welfare is thus zero
with perfect courts. But imperfect courts can still trigger consumer precautions,
with welfare benefits equal to (1 −  ( ∗Perfect ))   ∗ 1 ( − ) when bad types are
sued and go to trial. If the welfare gains over region 3 exceed the welfare gains
from perfect courts over region 2, imperfect courts increase welfare.
The two factors discussed above determine whether this inequality holds. Region 3 is the fraction of firms that fail to invest with perfect courts. The lower is
optimal investment with perfect courts, the higher the gains from imperfect courts
because this region is larger. Moreover, the gains from imperfect courts over this
region hinge on ( − ): the bigger the gains from consumer precautions, the
greater the value of imperfect courts. Finally, the "net" benefit over region 2 depends on the relative eﬃciency of producer investments in quality and consumers
investments in quality: the more eﬃcient consumers are relative to producers, the
smaller is the net benefit from perfect courts in this range.

5

Conclusion

This paper contributes to the literature on trial accuracy, focusing on the information benefits to outsiders to the litigation. To improve welfare, we want bad
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firms to go to trial, and, conditional on trial, the result to be accurate. This paper
shows these two objectives necessarily conflict. And this conflict implies that judicial errors do not necessarily reduce welfare, especially when it is more important
to identify which firms are bad than which firms are good. The results do not
imply that wholly uninformative courts are ideal. Rather, they suggest that some
degree of imperfection should be tolerated in order to induce some bad firms to
go to trial. This recommendation holds true even if there is no cost to making
courts more accurate. Moreover the imperfection should be of a particular type:
mistaken exonerations induce firms to go to trial but mistaken convictions do not.
In other words, if the null hypothesis is that a firm is a bad type, then welfare is
maximized by tolerating some Type I error but no Type II error. When consumer
precautions are relatively cheap compared to producer precautions, this is true,
even when firms have the ability to make investments to change their type and
improve their quality.
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Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1. Given perfect courts and the equilibrium strategies,
consumers’ consistent beliefs are
 =0 =1 =


  + (1 −   ) (1 − )

For a good type, the expected payoﬀ from going to trial is  . The payoﬀ from
deviating is  − min{  } − , which is less. For a bad type the payoﬀ from
settling is  − min{  } − . The payoﬀ from going to trial is  −  − , since
 = 1 and    by assumption. The payoﬀ from trial is strictly lower if    ,
which follows since A1 implies that      and     .
Proof of Proposition 2. We will use the following facts and derivatives in this
proof.
Fact 1. (A1) implies    for all values of   in Proposition 2. Proof.


= − (1 − ) 1−
 0, so  takes on its
If   = 1, then  =   . Moreover, 
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largest value at   = 1Finally, as noted in the proof of proposition 1, (A1) which
states that   (2  −  2 )  implies that     .
Fact 2.    in the candidate equilibrium for Proposition 2, in which the bad
types mix and the good types go to trial. Proof. If this were not true, then the bad
type’s payoﬀ to settling would exceed its payoﬀ to even a finding of non-liability.
And so, the bad type would strictly prefer settlement, a contradiction.
Fact 3.    for all (1  2 ) ∈ Θ. Proof. If a court is informative,
consumers must believe that a liability finding indicates a higher probability that
the firm is a bad type. Using the the consistent beliefs in the candidate equilibrium
for Proposition 2, this can be easily confirmed.
Fact 4. (A1) implies  [  + 2(1 −  )2 ]   2 for 2 ∈ [12 1]. Proof.
The inequality can be written 1   2 + 22   − 22  2 or
(2 ) = (22 − 1) 2 − 22   + 1
At 2 = 1, this value is (1) = (  − 1)2  0. At 2 = 12 , we have −  + 1  0.
Finally, 0 (2 ) = 2 2 − 2   0. So (2 )  0 in the relevant range of 2 .
Useful derivatives.
 (1 −  )

=
0


  (1 − )
=
0




 (1 −  )
=−
0
1
1 − 1

 (1 − )
=
0
1
1


 (1 −  )
=−
0
2
2

 (1 − )
=
0
2
1 − 2



= − (1 − )
0

1 −  

Turning to Proposition 2, consider the candidate equilibrium where good types
always goes to trial and the bad type mixes with probability   . To prove this is
an equilibrium requires: (1) Bayes consistent beliefs by the consumers and (2) bad
type indiﬀerence at the prices associated with those beliefs; and (3) that the good
type prefers trial at the prices associated with those beliefs. Because bad types
are more likely to be found liable than good types, if the bad type is indiﬀerent
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between trial and settlement, the good type will prefer trial. Thus, we can prove
the proposition simply by showing that, for every 1 and 2 , there exists a value
of   ∈ (0 1) which induces — via Bayes consistent beliefs — prices such that the
bad type is indiﬀerent.
Plugging prices into equation (1) and rearranging, we can write the indiﬀerence
condition as a function of the posteriors, which are themselves functions of 1 , 2
and   :
(   1  2 ) = min{  } − 1 min {  } − (1 − 1 ) min{   } = 0
Note that in equation (1) damages for the bad type after a liability finding equal
the settlement oﬀer, so those damages and the settlement oﬀer cancel out. Facts
1 and 2 mean that we can replace min{  } with  and min{   } with   ,
respectively. Thus
(   1  2 ) =  − 1 min {  } − (1 − 1 )  = 0
We complete the proof by showing that, for all (1  2 ) ∈ Θ, there is some
  ∈ (0 1) for which (   1  2 ) = 0. We achieve this in three steps. First,
we’ll show that (0 1  2 )  0 for all (1  2 ) ∈ Θ. Second, we’ll show that
 (1 1  2 )  0 for all (1  2 ) ∈ Θ. Finally, we show that   0 at any
(1  2 ) ∈ Θ, and hence a fixed point with a unique value of   ∈ (0 1) must exist
for all (1  2 ) ∈ Θ.
Step 1. The result follows from
(0 1  2 ) =  =


 0
 +   (1 − )

Step 2. The derivative of (1 1  2 ) with respect to 1 is
(11 2 )
1
(11 2 )
1

= − + (2 (1) −  (1)2 )   0 if  (1) ≤   (1)
= (2 −  2 ) − (2 − 2 )  0 if   (1)

We can sign these derivatives by observing that  (2 − 2 )   0 for   1.
1 2 )
 0 if  (1) ≤   (1) . Since    ,
Since     , (A1) implies that (1
1
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1 2 )
the (1
 0 when   (1) . It follows that, for any value of 2 , (1 1  2 )
1
takes on its largest value at 1 = 12 .
Denote as ∗2 the value of 2 that maximizes (1 12 2 ). We shall consider
two cases: (A)    and (B)    . In case (A), the indiﬀerence condition
may be written

µ
¶
µ
¶
¶
µ

1

1
1 ∗
 −

 1  2 =    −
2
2  + 2  (1 − ∗2 )
2   + 2  ∗2
This is strictly greater than zero since both right hand side terms in parentheses
are less than   . In case (B), the indiﬀerence equation is
µ
¶
¶
µ
1

1 ∗
1

 1  2 =    −  −
2
2
2   + 2 ∗2
This is negative if

µ
  2  −

¶


(  + 2∗2 (1 −  )

Fact 4 implies the right hand side is smaller than 2  −  2 . Thus (A1), which
¡
¢
says   2  −  2 , ensures the inequality above holds and  1 12  ∗2  0.
To summarize this step, (A1) ensures that  (1 1  2 )  0 no matter where it
takes on its maximum. And so, for any other configurations of errors  (1 1  2 )
must also be less than zero.
Step 3. Using the derivatives stated at the start of our proof, we see that
(  1 2 )

(  1 2 )


=
=

()

()


− [1 − 1 ] ()  0
− (1 −

1 ) ()

−

1 ()


if () ≤   ()

 0 if ()  

Thus, for every value of  compatible with assumption (A1),    0.
Proof of Proposition 3.
. Consistent beliefs are
=

Denote the bad firm’s mixing probability simply by

  (1 − 1 )
  (1 − 1 ) +   2

=
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 1
  1 +  (1 − 2 )

=

  (1 − )
  (1 − ) +   (1 − )

Part (A) Consumers take precautions.
(i) The bad type’s indiﬀerence
equation is
 − 1  − (1 − 1 )  = 0
Taking the derivative with respect to 1 yields
 

 
 − (1 − 1 )
 − (1 − 1 )
 −  +  = 0
 1
 1
1
Plugging in for  1 and solving for 1 we get
 −   −  (1 −  )

= 

1
 − (1 − 1 ) 


The denominator is negative since   0 and    0 (see the derivatives
given at the start of the proof to Proposition 2). Because  (2 − 2 )   0 for
  1 and     , (A1) implies that the numerator is positive. It follows that
1  0.
(ii) Taking the derivative of the indiﬀerence equation with respect to 2 and
solving for 2 yields
)
−(1 − 1 )  (1−


2
= 

2
 − (1 − 1 ) 



The denominator is once again negative. Because the numerator is also negative,
2  0.
Part (B) Consumers do not take precautions.
(i) The bad type’s
indiﬀerence equation is
 − 1  − (1 − 1 )  = 0
Take the derivative with respect to 1 yields
 

 
 − (1 − 1 )
 − (1 − 1 )

 1
 1
1
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−1

 

 − 1
 −  +   = 0
 1
1

Solving for 1 we get

=
1

(2 − 2 ) − (2 −  2 )


 − (1 − 1 ) 
 − 1 




The denominator is negative since   0,    0, and   0.
Because  (2 − 2 )   0 for   1 and    , the numerator is positive. It
follows that 1  0
(ii) Taking the derivative of the indiﬀerence equation with respect to 2 and
solving for 2 yields
)
1 (1−)
 − (1 − 1 )  (1−


2
2
= 


2
 − (1 − 1 )   − 1  


The sign of the numerator is ambiguous.
Proof of Proposition 4. Denote the bad firm’s mixing probability in Proposition 2 simply by . With perfect courts good types go to trial and bad types do
not. Expected welfare is
 Perfect =  
With imperfect courts we consider two cases.
The first is with consumer precautions following a finding of liability (   ).
Here expected welfare from imperfect courts is
 =   [(1 − ) + 2 ]  +  (1 − 2 ) ( − ) +   (1  2 ) 1 ( − )
⇔  =   erf  +    (1  2 ) 1 ( − ) −   (1 − 2 )

(9)

The derivative of  with respect to 2 is positive. Formally, we see that


=  1 ( − )
+     0
2
2
So reducing mistaken convictions always improves welfare from imperfect courts.
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Moreover, if we plug consistent beliefs for  defined in proposition (2) into the
condition    and rearrange results in
1       1      +   (1 − 2 )
This inequality implies the sum of the last three terms in equation (9) must be
positive. So,    Perfect .
The second case considered is where consumers do not take precautions at all.
Here expected welfare from imperfect courts is the same the expected welfare from
perfect courts. Because no precautions are taken, the second and third terms in
(9) are zero. Thus, changes in accuracy have no eﬀect on welfare.
Proof of Proposition 5. Denote the bad firm’s mixing probability in Proposition 2 simply by . Allowing settlement, the expected payoﬀ to a firm is prior to
knowing its type is
[  2 +   (1 − 1 )]  + [  (1 − 2 ) +   1 ]  + [(1 − ) + (1 − ) ] 
As usual we caonsider two cases, with and without consumer precautions. First,
plugging in prices when consumers take precautions gives
 − [  (1 − 1 ) +   (1 − )] − [  (1 − 2 ) +   1 ]
Prohibiting settlement is akin to setting  = 1, without changing 1 or 2 (i.e.,
mandating that the settlement decision be independent of the court errors). Take
the derivative of the expected payoﬀ with respect to ,yields
−[   −   1 −   ] − [ 1 ]
which reduces to  1 [ − ]  0And so, the expected payoﬀ is maximized where
 = 1. Second, plugging in prices into the ex ante expected payoﬀ for firms when
consumers do not take preacutions is
 − [ (1 − 1 ) +   (1 − ) +   1 ] =   
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Banning settlement has no eﬀect on this payoﬀ. In sum, banning settlement
improves expected firm payoﬀs when consumers take precaution and has no eﬀect
on expected payoﬀs when consumers do not take precautions.
Proof of Proposition 6.
The firms engage in two pooling activities in this equilibrium. First, both firms
make the same settlement oﬀer. Second, both firms decide to settle rather than
go to trial. Denote the pooling settlement oﬀer . The plaintiﬀ’s belief that the
firm is a bad type following this oﬀer is
=


  +   (1 − )

The oﬀer that makes the plaintiﬀ just indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting
is
 = 1  + (1 − )(1 − 2 )
Suppose that plaintiﬀ beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path are the same as the pooling
beliefs. Under this assumption, the plaintiﬀ will reject any oﬀer less than . And
so, if both types wish to settle,  is the best possible oﬀer.
Next we consider whether settlement is indeed optimal. Oﬀ the equilibrium
path, assume that good and bad firms proceed to trial in the same proportion as
they exist in the population. This belief survives the intuitive criterion because
going to trial is not strictly dominated for either type. If, for example, consumers
believe oﬀ the equilibrium path that all firms in trial are good, the bad type would
want to deviate and go to trial. The consumer belief following a finding of no
liability is
  (1 − 1 )
=
  (1 − 1 ) +   (1 − )2
which is an increasing function of . For any given range of errors and level of 
set  so that   = . In so doing, we see that
=

  2 
  2  +  (1 − 1 )[ − ]

which must be less than one. For any values of 2 and 1 if   , the consumer
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takes precautions following a finding of no liability. Consequently, the consumer
also takes precautions following a liability finding. The payoﬀ to the good type
from trial is thus
 −  − (1 − 2 )
The payoﬀ to the good type from settlement — to hiding that a suit has been filed
— is
(1 −   ) − 
A deviation by the good type from settlement to trial is unprofitable if
 −  − (1 − 2 )   −   − 
which reduces to
 − (1 − 2 )   −   
or
[1  + (1 − )(1 − 2 ) − (1 − 2 )]   −   
which clearly holds as  → 0 since     . The bad type will not want to deviate
either because the bad type’s payoﬀ to trial with minimally informative courts
must be less than the good type’s payoﬀ to trial.
Proof of Proposition 10 . The proof mirrors the proof of proposition 1 for firms
that are good without investing and firms that are bad and do not invest. For bad
firms that invest, the payoﬀ to going to trial is  − . The payoﬀ from deviating
and settling is   −  − , which is strictly less since   = (1 − ) .
Proof of Proposition 20 . The proof builds oﬀ the proof of proposition 2. The
only diﬀerence is that for all potential values of investment by the bad firms, we
have   =   +  ()     . It follows that      . And so, if   (2  −  2 )  ,
it must be true that   (2 − 2 ) because  (2 − 2 )   0 for   1. To
complete the proof replace  with  throughout the proof of proposition 2 above.
Doing so demonstrates that there is a semi-separating equilibrium for every value
of   , including the   associated with the equilibrium level of investment,  ∗ .
Proof of Lemma 7.

When there are perfect courts, the posterior in the no
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signal state is
=

1 −  −  () 
(1 −   −  ()  ) + [  +  () ](1 − )

or
=

1 −  −  () 
1 −  −  () 

Plugging this into equation (5) we have
¸
1 −   −  () 
 +  −  = 0

(1 −  −  () 
∙

Write the RHS as
() = 

∙

¸
1 −  −  () 
+  − 
(1 −  −  ()) 

Notice that (∞) = −∞ because the first term in (∞) is finite and the third
term is −∞. Next consider (0) which must be positive since
(0) =

1 − 
 +   0
(1 −   )

Finally, note that
 0 () = −

[1 −   −  () ]  
 
 +
 − 1
(1 −   −  ()  )
(1 −  −  ()  )2

which reduces to


µ

( − 1) 
(1 −   −  ()  )2

¶

−1

This is less than zero because   1. Since  (∞)  0,  (0)  0, and  0 ()  0,
there must be a 0   ∗Perfect  ∞ such that ( ∗Perfect ) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 8. We will use the following facts later in this proof.
Denote the bad firm’s mixing probability in the semiseparating equilibrium of
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Proposition 20 simply by . Consistent beliefs for consumers are
  (1 −  ( ∗ )) (1 − 1 )
 =
 (1 −  ( ∗ )) (1 − 1 ) + ( +    ( ∗ )) 2
 (1 −  ( ∗ )) 1
 =
 (1 −  ( ∗ ))  ∗ 1 + (  +    ( ∗ )) (1 − 2 )
 (1 −  ( ∗ )) (1 − )
 =
 (1 −  ( ∗ )) (1 − ) + (  +   ( ∗ )) (1 − )
Some useful derivatives of these beliefs are
 (1 −  )

=
0




 (1 − ) 
=−
0

1 − 

 ( ∗ )  (1 −  )

=−
0

 ( ∗ ) (1 −  ( ∗ ))


 ( ∗ )  (1 − )
−
0

 ( ∗ ) (1 −  ( ∗ ))

In equilibrium, two equations jointly determine the investment level and the
bad type’s mixing probability:
(1 + 2 − 1)[  −   + ] − 
(1 − 1 )  + 1   =  
Plugging in for prices, these two equations can be written as
(1 + 2 − 1)[ +  −   ] −  = 0
 − 1  − (1 − 1 )  = 0
Totally diﬀerentiating the two equations with respect to 1 gives


"


1

1

#

=

"

)
]
[  −  − ] − (2 + 1 − 1)  (1−
1−1
 −   −  (1 −  )
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#

where  = [1  2 ; 3  4 ] and
1 =
2 =
3 =
4 =

¶

 −1
−[1 + 2 − 1]


−(1 + 2 − 1) 



 − (1 − 1 ) 




 − (1 − 1 ) 


µ

(A2) implies that 1  0. The fact that    0 implies 2  0. (A3) ensures
that 3  0. And  implies 4  0. As a result, the det () = 1 4 − 2 4 is
positive.
Applying Cramer’s rule, we know that 1 = ||  || where
=

"

)
[  −  − ] − (2 + 1 − 1)  (1−
1−1
 −   −  (1 −  )

2
4

#

Since ||  0,  (1 ) =  (||). We know that [ −   − ] − (2 +
¡
¢
)
(1− )
is equivalent to [   −  −   ] − (2 + 1 − 1) 1−
 — an
1 − 1)  (1−
1−1
1
expression which is negative since the payoﬀ to a liability finding is lower than the
payoﬀ to a non-liability finding. In the proof of Proposition 2 we demonstrated
that assumption (A1) implies  −   −  (1 −  )  0. The determinant of  is
thus
µ
¶
 (1 −  )
− 2 ( −   −  (1 −  ) )
4 [  −  − ] − (2 + 1 − 1)
1 − 1
which is positive. So, 1  0.
(ii) Totally diﬀerentiating with respect to 2 gives


"


2

2

#

=

"


[  −  − ] + (1 + 2 − 1)[ 
]
2
 (1− )
−(1 − 1 )) 2 
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Applying Cramer’s rule, we have  (2 ) = (||), where
=

"

)
 ] 2
[  −  − ] − (1 + 2 − 1)  (1−
2
 (1− )
−(1 − 1 ) 2 
4

#

The determinant of  is
µ
¶
µ
¶
 (1 −  )
 (1 −  )
[  −  − ] − (2 + 2 − 1)
 4 + (1 − 1 )
 2
2
2
which has an ambiguous sign.
Imperfect courts generate more welfare than perfect

Proof of Proposition 9.
courts if:
Z

 ∗Pe rfec t

∗

(  − )  ()   (1 −  ( ∗ ))    ∗ 1 ( − )

Perfect courts generate additional investment with probability  ( ∗Perfect )− ( ∗ ).
Imperfect courts generate additional consumer precaution with probability (1 −  ( ∗ )),
which is larger than  ( ∗Perfect ) −  ( ∗ ). Thus, we get the benefit of the consumer
precautions from imperfect courts over a larger range of the distribution of . If
we add and subtract  ( ∗Perfect ) ∗   1 ( − ) on the RHS, we get
Z

 ∗P erfe ct

∗

(   − )  ()  

(1 −  ( ∗Perfect )) ∗   1 ( − ) + [ ( ∗Perfect ) −  ( ∗ )]   ∗ 1 ( − )
Rearrange and we have
(1 −  ( ∗Perfect ))   ∗ 1 ( − ) 
Z

 ∗Pe rfec t

∗

(   − )  ()  − [ ( ∗Perfect ) −  ( ∗ )]   ∗ 1 ( − )
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